fix: user passwords cleanup #1202
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1. Adds benchmarks comparing bcrypt and our pbkdf2 settings 1. Changes the pbkdf2 hash iterations back to 65k. 1024 is insecure 1. Gets rid of the short circuit when the user isn't found, preventing timing attacks which can reveal which emails exist on a deployment
Codecov Report
@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #1202 +/- ##
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- Coverage 66.27% 65.35% -0.92%
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Files 265 261 -4
Lines 16681 16750 +69
Branches 157 157
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- Hits 11055 10947 -108
- Misses 4484 4658 +174
- Partials 1142 1145 +3
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kylecarbs
approved these changes
Apr 28, 2022
| // https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/templates/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp2261.pdf | ||
| func Compare(hashed string, password string) (bool, error) { | ||
| // If the hased password provided is empty, simulate comparing a real hash. |
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Is this so attackers can't use a timing attack to check if the user has no password set?
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It's for users that don't exist, so that there's no difference in response times based on if the user exists or not.
kylecarbs
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that referenced
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Jun 10, 2022
1. Adds benchmarks comparing bcrypt and our pbkdf2 settings 1. Changes the pbkdf2 hash iterations back to 65k. 1024 is insecure 1. Gets rid of the short circuit when the user isn't found, preventing timing attacks which can reveal which emails exist on a deployment ``` $ go test -bench . goos: linux goarch: amd64 pkg: github.com/coder/coder/coderd/userpassword cpu: Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900K CPU @ 3.60GHz BenchmarkBcryptMinCost-16 1651 702727 ns/op 5165 B/op 10 allocs/op BenchmarkPbkdf2MinCost-16 1669 714843 ns/op 804 B/op 10 allocs/op BenchmarkBcryptDefaultCost-16 27 42676316 ns/op 5246 B/op 10 allocs/op BenchmarkPbkdf2-16 26 45902236 ns/op 804 B/op 10 allocs/op PASS ok github.com/coder/coder/coderd/userpassword 5.036s ```
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timing attacks which can reveal which emails exist on a deployment